Earlier this year, the chairman of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party asked Elon Musk if he was withholding StarShield satellite services from United States service members on and around Taiwan. Musk replied that he was in full compliance with his Pentagon contract. Shortly thereafter, Musk refused a Taiwanese bid to secure Starlink services and Taiwan announced it would be developing a “Starlink” constellation system of its own. As a stopgap, Taiwan contracted with OneWeb for satellite internet and communication services. 

Two years ago, to find out, the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center proposed conducting a space war game that focused on a near-term Taiwan-China scenario. This June, it tapped the talents of current and retired officials, Congressional Staff and outside experts to play the game. They were divided into multiple teams, representing Taiwan, Eutelsat OneWeb, the Allied Space Nations (the U.S., U.K., Japan, France, Russia and India), and China which was played by the Control team.

Top security analysts have noted how China could disable Taiwan’s undersea cable and disrupt its microwave, cell and space-based communications systems in order to secure a smokeless victory over the Island. What has complicated this prospect is the increasing importance of private commercial space-based communications and internet services. The controversy surrounding Starlink’s selective support of Ukrainian military operations amply demonstrates this point.

The increased military relevance of private space-based services raises several policy questions. What national security roles should governments ask or require commercial space service providers to play during a security crisis or war? What conditions, if any, should governments place on commercial space operations under their jurisdiction or that they contract with? Should governments set minimum standards for cyber and physical hardening that commercial satcom providers must meet in order to be eligible to compete for government contracts? 

What obligation, if any, does the government have to protect private space firms’ assets in grey conflicts and wars? What are the U.S., its space faring allies and industry willing or able to do to backfill communication systems that a customer, like Taiwan, might suffer? What is the proper response to repeated “accidental” or deniable assaults on one’s commercial and military space systems?

To find out, the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center conducted a space war game that focused on a near-term Taiwan-China scenario. It tapped the talents of current and retired officials, Congressional Staff and outside experts to play the game. They were divided into multiple teams, representing Taiwan, Eutelsat OneWeb, the Allied Space Nations (the U.S., U.K., Japan, France, Russia and India), and China which was played by the Control team.

The war game

The game begins in late 2026, at which point the crowding of satellite mega-constellations in low-Earth orbit (LEO) has increased the potential for near-miss collisions. China is completing its deployment of three planned LEO communication internet service constellations. China warns Eutelsat (a European space operation that provides Taiwan with communications and internet services) that China SatNet intends to launch several of its Guowang constellation satellites at an altitude similar to several of OneWeb’s satellites. China publicly objects to Eutelsat OneWeb’s “irresponsible” placement of its satellites so close to China’s. In anticipation of possible conjunctions, China launches a small fleet of “peaceful” debris removal satellites. 

Meanwhile, in an effort to increase communications resiliency, Taiwan reaches an agreement with Japan to host OneWeb downlink terminals on Japan’s nearby islands. China condemns the agreement and demands Japan dismantle any terminals that may have been installed. China also announces an expanded air defense identification zone and sends civilian vessels close to where the cables are being laid. 

Amid these rising tensions, Eutelsat OneWeb maneuvers one of its satellites to avoid a conjunction with one of China’s Guowang satellites, but fails, prompting Beijing to make a formal legal complaint against Eutelsat OneWeb. 

At this point, the game players begin their first move. The Eutelsat OneWeb team tried to gather data to prove that OneWeb was blameless for the conjunction with China’s satellite. The Taiwan team reached out to the Allied Space Nation team to blame China for the conjunction but failed to gain an international audience because it lacked legal sovereign status. The Allied Space Nations team, however, did support Taiwan’s request for an investigation and assigned the U.K. to handle the liability claim.

Following the conjunction, Taiwan experienced disruptions to its satellite communications via jamming and cyberattacks. Taiwan also learned that several of its key undersea communications cables were cut. 

When Taiwan asked for assistance, the Eutelsat OneWeb team worried that helping Taiwan might displease its shareholders and risk Eutelsat’s future Asian markets, including in China. The Taiwan team requested military and emergency communications support from the U.S. Meanwhile, Taiwanese public confidence in the Taiwanese government wavered. The Allied Space Nations team made an effort to repair Taiwan’s communications infrastructure but took no offensive action against China.

The U.S. Navy, which has been tracking Chinese submarines, confirms that a submarine was responsible for cutting Taiwan’s cables, prompting the U.S. to deploy naval forces near Taiwan. Further cable cuts, locally launched drone strikes against Taiwan’s microwave stations, electrical supply system and cell towers, as well as additional jamming of OneWeb signals, lead to widespread communication outages and public panic. 

Separately, China mobilized debris removal satellites in LEO near critical U.S. military satellites, damaging one of them. Amidst this chaos, China announced a maritime quarantine of several Taiwanese ports, deploying coast guard and naval vessels to enforce new inspection rules.

At this point, the Eutelsat OneWeb team refused to offer additional communications support to Taiwan beyond existing contracts. The Taiwan team urgently asked Washington for additional immediate military and communications support. Washington could not meet this request. In desperation, Taiwan then asked the Allied Space Nation team to sanction China, send a carrier strike group, jam China’s communications satellites and cut its undersea communication cables. The Allied Space Nations team instead pushed for a U.N. resolution condemning China (which Beijing and Moscow vetoed) then dispatched naval vessels east of Taiwan and airlifted replacement satellite communication downlink equipment. The Allied Space Nation team still took no offensive military action against China.

A second LEO conjunction between a U.S. military satellite and a Chinese debris removal satellite coincided with a Chinese fighter jet intercepting and damaging the wing of a U.S. humanitarian airlift plane to Taiwan. The cargo plane returns to Japan. 

At this point, the President of the U.S. decides to launch covert cyberattacks against China’s Beidou satellite ground stations. China responds by launching similar cyberattacks on American GPS systems; the U.S. redoubles its attacks against the Beidou system. With U.S. naval forces closing in to disrupt China’s naval quarantine of Taiwan, Beijing calls for a mutual ceasefire in exchange for bilateral talks over Taiwan’s future as a province of China. The U.S., allies and Taiwan rejected this offer but had no diplomatic or economic sanctions strategy to pressure Beijing to be more reasonable. Further military escalation seemed likely.At this point, the President of the U.S. decides to launch covert cyberattacks against China’s Beidou satellite ground stations. China responds by launching similar cyberattacks on American GPS systems; the U.S. redoubles its attacks against the Beidou system. With U.S. naval forces closing in to disrupt China’s naval quarantine of Taiwan, Beijing calls for a mutual ceasefire in exchange for bilateral talks over Taiwan’s future as a province of China. The U.S., allies and Taiwan reject this offer; further military escalation is likely.

Key findings

At this point, the game ended. In the hot wash, the players made three key findings:

  1. Washington, its space-faring allies and industry players must clarify how they might backfill Taiwanese communication systems well before China might disable them. The game spotlighted how vulnerable Taiwan’s current communication systems are to military assaults. The Island’s ground and undersea cable systems were by far the most vulnerable and difficult to repair. With these and Taiwan’s space-based communication systems disabled, China could conceivably absorb Taiwan in a relatively bloodless war. One fix to help prevent this would be for America and its space-faring allies to give Taiwan access to their communications systems. Private space firms could also offer to backfill prospective Taiwanese communication losses. Making such offers now, before there’s any war over Taiwan, would help deter China. In the midst of war, however, the game’s play demonstrated that orchestrating practical communications rescue packages would be difficult. First, Taiwan had not openly shared what its communication vulnerabilities were until after China disabled them. Second, once Taiwan asked for help, the private sector team’s deliberations were bogged down as it tried to divine the market implications of doing so. The OneWeb team also had difficulty juggling how to deal with Chinese shareholders on their parent organization’s board. Finally, it was unclear which U.S. agency should play what role during the game, and coordinating actions with space industries and allies proved challenging.

Recommendations: The U.S., Taiwan, its allies and industry must address Taiwan’s communications systems vulnerabilities more openly. Certainly, friendly governments and private space service providers won’t volunteer to backfill prospective Taiwanese communication losses in a war if Taiwan itself is unwilling to identify its communications system vulnerabilities in peacetime. Seriously embattled states such as Ukraine openly discuss their vulnerabilities with considerable vigor. Taiwan needs to follow their example. Meanwhile, the U.S and allied governments must open the public aperture on Taiwan’s communications vulnerabilities by exploring how government entities and private space firms might reconstitute Taiwanese space communications systems and ground-based terminals. Routine government hearings, reports, and war games, both official and classified and unofficial and unclassified, would help. Also, the U.S. and its space-faring allies must clarify how commercial space firms under their jurisdiction (such as Starlink and Kuiper) might balance their China interests with requests that they come to Taiwan’s aid. Again, conducting routine unclassified and classified war games with industry and U.S. and allied government staff could help clarify what proportionate responses might be to Chinese cyber intrusions, degradations of U.S. and allied space awareness systems, as well as other acts of war in space. The same clarifications should be made regarding future Chinese disruptions of undersea cable, ground-based microwave, cell phone and electrical supply systems. This would help clarify for both friends and enemies how the U.S. might counter and deter offensive Chinese communications misbehavior both in space and on Earth. Such simulations should also seek to clarify what roles U.S. agencies and private industry should play in different crises.

  1. The U.S. and its allies must address Taiwan’s lack of legal recognition, which leaves it uniquely vulnerable to offensive Chinese space and terrestrial military actions against Taiwanese communications systems. Taiwan is not recognized as a sovereign state. As such, it lacks legal standing to protest any clear acts of war China may perpetrate against it in any recognized international forum. Worse, no American laws stipulate that America has any legal obligation to come to Taiwan’s defense nor does any law clarify the circumstances under which it might do so. Finally, Taiwan no longer holds membership in the international organizations most relevant to addressing interruptions of communications and other hostile actions China may take against it. In the game, the Taiwan team asked states that still recognized it to plead Taiwan’s case before the United Nations and other international organizations. This failed: No state could effectively spotlight a violation of international law against Taiwan at forums where Taiwan was viewed as being a Chinese province. Taiwan’s ambiguous sovereignty also limited what the OneWeb team was willing to do. The firm had to balance maintaining its reputation for providing reliable service to Taiwan with continued access to China’s massive market. Other private space service providers are likely to face this same dilemma. China’s being a shareholder in Eutelsat, OneWeb’s parent organization, presented an additional complication. 

Recommendations: Washington can hardly expect Taiwan to invest in its own defense if the U.S. and its allies are unwilling to recognize Taiwan as an entity worth defending. Recognizing Taiwan as a sovereign nation or codifying when the U.S. might come to its defense would obviously resolve this. Neither, however, are politically easy steps to take. At a minimum, however, the U.S. and its space-faring allies can and must do more to demonstrate Taiwan’s defense matters. One idea players suggested was to have the U.S. organize and invite Taiwan to multilateral exercises focused on likely military and civilian space-domain crises. Besides clarifying what the most likely space threats and optimal counters might be, these gatherings could clarify space communications standards the U.S., its allies and private space firms might adopt to maximize space interoperability in any future Asian-Pacific conflict. They could also consider mandating minimum cyber and physical hardening standards for commercial companies to compete for government contracts. The decision to meet these standards would be up to the commercial companies. They also could be used to clarify how to prevent dangerous Chinese participation in private satellite firms. Finally, to help assure Taiwan has credible standing at such exercises, Taipei should consider devising anti-satellite capabilities of its own that could temporarily disable Chinese satellites in plausibly deniable ways.

  1. Washington and its space faring allies must develop additional plausibly deniable military space options to deter and counter similar Chinese capabilities. Proving hostile intent is required in prosecutorial legal proceedings. In space, proving such intent is difficult. Humans operate hundreds and thousands of miles away from key military and commercial space systems. Diminishing differences between military and civilian space systems further complicates proving hostile intent: Unlike navies, air forces, and armies, space forces can legally be employed with systems that lack any military insignia. As a result, hostile space acts may seem just as likely to be accidents as not. Yet another complicating factor is that plausibly deniable temporary countermeasures against other states’ satellites are almost all highly classified and, therefore, difficult to spotlight. Each of these factors slowed the U.S.-Allied team’s game play. Eager to establish a legal casus belli before taking military action, most of the U.S.-Allied team held off recommending any military action. Fortifying their reticence was the team’s lack of familiarity with what space capabilities were available to disable China’s space-based systems temporarily in a deniable fashion. These systems include U.S. rendezvous satellites that can cause damage, move out of position and de-fuel hostile satellites; space and ground-based lasers that can temporarily dazzle an imagery satellite’s optics; offensive cyber and electronic warfare capabilities that can temporarily interfere with a satellite’s operation; and more. Many of the game participants’ unfamiliarity with and initial wariness to discuss these sensitive systems worked to China’s advantage: In specific, it induced the U.S.-Allied and Taiwan teams to take traditional military measures: sending aircraft carriers, conducting air lifts and mounting naval blockades. These were slow and actually invited Chinese offensive counters. A Chinese fighter plane attacked and damaged a U.S. “Berlin Airlift” cargo plane while in flight. An egregiously slow aircraft carrier task force deployment afforded China the time it needed to further disable Taiwan’s communications systems underwater, in space and within Taiwan. Only after China had damaged three of America’s most exquisite military satellites, cut nearly all of Taiwan’s underseas communications trunk line cables, attacked Taiwan’s electrical supply system (hobbling much of the Island’s cell communications), blockaded three major Taiwanese ports and destroyed four microwave stations on the island did the U.S. team choose to blind Chinese Beidou satellites with ground-based lasers and threaten to enforce a maritime exclusion zone around China. Shortly thereafter, China offered to suspend any further quarantine of Taiwan in exchange for U.S.-Chinese negotiations over the future of the island. Upon reflection, some players suggested it would have been useful for the U.S. allied team to have acted against China’s space assets sooner.

Recommendations: To counter the grey space warfare America’s foes might exercise, a much broader spectrum of U.S. policymakers and military planners need to appreciate America’s options for temporarily disabling an enemy’s space capabilities in a deniable manner. This, in turn, requires reducing the extremely high levels of classification associated with these capabilities so a wider number of mid-level officials can gain experience and judgment regarding their possible use in crises. This will require much more extensive space war gaming that should include not only U.S. government officials and staff (in realistic, simulated Excom-like meetings), but members of allied governments, private space firms, and government lawyers. Such gaming should be used to clarify what might precipitate the use of temporary disabling capabilities and what additional capabilities might be desirable. All of this would likely increase U.S. and allied demand to develop and deploy additional reversible offensive space capabilities. These should be designed to give Washington and its allies options other than to retreat or to use terrestrial military measures that could be far more escalatory.

A move-by-move breakdown

During move one, the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center tasked each team with addressing three main controversies: a conjunction between a Eutelsat OneWeb satellite and a Chinese satellite, followed by Beijing’s legal complaint against OneWeb and its launching states; a hostile incident between a Chinese Air Force J-8 interceptor and a U.S. P-8 reconnaissance aircraft in the East China Sea; and communications disruptions across Taiwan due to cut undersea cables around the island.

OneWeb team:
In response to the conjunction crisis, the Eutelsat OneWeb team first sought to establish legal representation to handle China’s complaint. After discussions with the Control team, the United Kingdom was identified as the state responsible for representing Eutelsat OneWeb, placing the legal responsibility with the Allied Space Nations team.

The Eutelsat OneWeb team then sought to gather data about the conjunction to prove its innocence and secure compensation for the satellite loss. OneWeb considered contracting a private space debris removal service to complement China’s debris removal efforts. To understand the context of the conjunction better, the firm reached out to the Space Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC), a U.S.-based non-profit promoting space security through information sharing among its members, which will likely soon include Taiwan. OneWeb hoped that sharing data with ISAC members would clarify the conjunction’s cause.

Despite these efforts, the Eutelsat OneWeb team acknowledged the difficulty in proving China’s wrongdoing and clearing Eutelsat OneWeb’s liability. Given this ambiguity, the team decided to focus on establishing safeguards for all space actors, advocating for peaceful satellite use and cooperation to prevent future incidents, and reducing the need to assign blame. OneWeb discussed creating a space crisis hotline and having a pre-established entity for directing safe spacecraft movement. Throughout these discussions, the Eutelsat OneWeb team kept in touch with the Allied Space Nation team for updates and emphasized gathering concrete evidence before assuming the collision was deliberate. At no time did the group discuss how the Liability Convention establishes a fault standard for on orbit liability, unlike the launching state’s absolute liability for terrestrial damages.

Even with the introduction of the second and third crises, the Eutelsat OneWeb team focused on strategies to appease shareholders. For instance, it considered removing the U.S. as a future launch provider to appease European and Chinese shareholders. The team briefly discussed expanding services to Taiwan after learning about the damaged undersea cables but were wary without a clear cost-benefit analysis.

Taiwan team:
In response to the satellite conjunction, the Taiwan team requested the U.S. launch a joint investigation and asked the Eutelsat OneWeb team for its relevant data. The Taiwan team’s main goal was to establish Chinese culpability and lobby for support from established nations by portraying Taiwan as a victim.

However, Taiwan’s lack of recognized nationhood made it difficult to find an effective venue to voice their complaints. The team reached out to the U.S., U.K., France and Japan but struggled to represent themselves in international forums, particularly at the U.N. The team considered seeking non-governmental organization assistance but found no viable options.

The Taiwan team viewed the conjunction as a sign of future Chinese communications sabotage, a concern that later proved correct. It warned the Allied Space Nation team, particularly Japan, about potential interference with the undersea cables. The Taiwan team asked Japan to monitor their outlying islands and maritime space closely.

Regarding the incident between U.S. and Chinese military aircraft, the Taiwan team believed it was motivated by tensions over Taiwan. The team urged the U.S. and other Allied Space nations to clarify their red lines in response, seeing the incident as an act of war instigated by the Chinese military. However, the U.S. was hesitant to set red lines or take military action, as it did not feel the conflict had escalated to a point where that was necessary. The Taiwan team also discussed preparing Taiwan’s military for self-defense but given the ambiguity of the situation, were hesitant to fully mobilize. 

Faced with communication disruptions and damaged undersea cables, the Taiwan team struggled to balance asking for military assistance and emergency communication support with maintaining public faith in the government. The team sent a representative to Eutelsat OneWeb to discuss continued operations in Taiwan, but the Eutelsat OneWeb team was hesitant to engage directly, and was pessimistic about the company’s ability to provide emergency communications support on short notice.

By the end of move one, the Taiwan team decided to again request U.S. military support, specifically deploying a U.S. carrier strike group to Japan, and sought “Starlink-esque” communications support from commercial entities in Allied Space Nation countries.

Allied Space Nation team:
The Allied Space Nations team supported Taiwan’s request for a formal investigation of the conjunction. The team responded by saying that the U.S. backed a full, transparent investigation and would leverage its intelligence resources in support.

Their next priority was to establish the nation responsible for responding to China’s legal complaint. The Control team clarified that the U.K., as the registered launch state for the OneWeb satellite, was responsible for handling the liability claim. The team decided the U.K. should supply real-time reporting data from the U.K. National Space Operations Center to the U.S. investigation, with support from other Allied Space Nation countries’ space situational awareness capabilities.

In response to Taiwan’s warnings about future disruptions to communications infrastructure, the Allied Space Nation team decided that Japan would increase maritime operations to ensure the safety of its sensitive cables. They discussed sending satellite communication ground terminals to the region, in case of sabotage on the island, but decided to wait as the crisis was isolated to the space domain. The Allied Space Nation team proposed that Japan might provide operational and technical support to U.S.-installed communications assets in Taiwan, but the players felt it wasn’t necessary at this point in gameplay.

The Allied Space Nations team questioned China about its alleged evidence absolving responsibility for the conjunction and why China’s satellite was operating close to the Eutelsat constellation. China asserted that the OneWeb satellite moved into its established orbit and restated its innocence without providing specific evidence.

Following the hostile aircraft encounter, the Allied Space Nation team minimized the event to limit China’s narrative control. The team reached out to China directly, using a U.S.-China crisis communications hotline, but China responded curtly, implying the incident was a reaction to the conjunction and Western interference. The Allied Space Nation team made multiple attempts to de-escalate tensions through diplomatic channels, including efforts by a U.S. representative and a visit from a U.K. representative to discuss a larger joint investigation and identify a neutral third party to mediate. However, China was unwilling to de-escalate the situation or discuss the incident further.

In response to Taiwan’s damaged undersea cables and the subsequent request for U.S. support, the Allied Space Nation team deployed satellite communication ground terminal installation teams to Okinawa to prepare for potential deployment to Taiwan. The Allied Space Nation team planned to wait for concrete evidence of Chinese sabotage before sending the teams to the island. While awaiting confirmation of China’s aggression, the Allied Space Nation team decided that the U.S. and Japan would offer direct assistance in investigating and repairing the cable breaks. They agreed that U.S. Navy vessels would escort Japanese repair vessels. By the end of move one, the Allied Space Nation team had taken no offensive action toward China.

Move two

At the start of move two, China disrupted Taiwan’s communications by jamming the island’s OneWeb downlink signals, attacking the satellite system’s ground control segments with cyber-attacks and using drones carrying small explosive payloads to take out four microwave communications stations around the island. Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy determines that at least one of the undersea communications cables cut near the outlying islands was not cut by a trawler, but by a Chinese submarine. The White House shares this information with Taiwan.

In addition to the branch cables that were severed in move one, nearly all branch cables around the island are cut, as are several trunk cables. Taiwan experiences major disruption in its mobile phone networks, internet services and landline connections. 

Shortly thereafter, China moves its fleet of space debris removal satellites dangerously close to several of America’s critical, LEO military satellites. Two exquisite U.S. military satellites are slightly damaged. It is unclear if space debris or Chinese spacecraft damage the satellites. 

Taiwan’s predicament turns even more dire when rolling electrical blackouts paralyze the island. Taiwanese authorities struggle to determine if the blackouts are caused by remote cyber-attacks on Taiwan’s electrical supply systems or direct interference by mainland Chinese agents working within Taiwan’s utility system. 

Finally, Beijing begins enforcing a maritime quarantine area around Taiwan. China requires the shipper of any cargo destined for Taiwan to file advance notice with Chinese customs and law enforcement officials or risk inspections, fines and impoundment at nearby ports. China also announces that if Taiwanese officials work directly with Beijing on future telecommunications partnerships with foreign countries, Beijing will help restore Taiwan’s communication systems by fortifying Taiwan’s links to the mainland. China denies any responsibility for the outages, attributing them to external sabotage instead.

OneWeb team:
In response to Taiwan’s announcement of the attacks on its satellite infrastructure and sensitive cables, the Eutelsat OneWeb team recognized the increased importance of their space-based communications for Taiwan. However, the team was unwilling to shoulder this responsibility alone, fearing Beijing’s ire and potential contract losses in the region. Instead, the team wanted other commercial space communications service providers to shoulder the gaps in Taiwan’s communications system. The team made it clear it was not invested in Taiwan’s safety or success, viewing it as separate from their corporate interests.

Despite the initial satellite conjunction and subsequent attacks on Eutelsat OneWeb’s ground and microwave stations, the Eutelsat OneWeb team remained confident in their constellation’s redundancy and operational continuity. The team discussed enhancing cybersecurity measures to protect the constellation from future attacks and focused on maintaining their services rather than addressing Taiwan’s cable damage. 

The team expressed reluctance to provide further space system-related repair or communication services without clear compensation and discussed when a contract might be considered void due to acts of war. It informed Taiwan it would not provide services outside of pre-existing contracts unless compensated at a higher rate for rush service, and even then, response times might not meet urgent needs.

Taiwan team:
At the start of move two, the Taiwan team rallied allies for military intervention, emergency communications repair and disaster relief resources, prioritizing reestablishing communications and electrical power. 

The team had limited options to reestablish Taiwan’s domestic communications system. It considered asking the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to use GEONETCast as an emergency communication method. Subsequent discussion indicated these options would not be very robust. The team noted it would have helped if there was interoperability between different satellite constellations, as this might ensure coverage if one system experienced disruption.

The Taiwan team informed the Allied Space Nations team that Taiwan needed to re-establish communications and electrical power within 24 hours, hoping to prompt quicker action from the U.S. Convinced of China’s culpability, the Taiwan team did not investigate the attacks further or seek concrete evidence for attribution.

The team specifically requested the U.S. send a carrier strike group to patrol around the island and that the U.S. attack China’s communications systems by jamming China’s space-based communications or cutting its undersea cables. 

Domestically, the Taiwan team struggled to overcome communication disruptions and unify the population. The team discussed mobilizing fishing vessels for maritime situational awareness and sent representatives from village to village using trucks and short-range radios. It also attempted to rally the public through radio transmissions from the Taiwanese President but were unsure of their effectiveness. In a desperate act to deter further aggression, it asked the international community to enact economic sanctions on China and block energy exports through the Strait of Hormuz.

Allied Space Nations team:
At the start of move two, the Allied Space Nations team convened an emergency U.N. Security Council meeting and pushed for a resolution condemning China’s interference with Taiwan’s communications and international commerce. China and Russia vetoed the resolution and demanded that the U.S. and its allies cease their involvement in what they described as China’s internal affairs.

Undeterred, the Allied Space Nations team communicated directly with China, demanding that it withdraw Chinese naval vessels to give Taiwan a chance to repair its damaged undersea cables and to avoid further disruptions to the global economy. China was defiant, insisted on its sovereign rights over Taiwan, and denied any responsibility for damaging the undersea cables.

Recognizing the need for broader regional support, the Allied Space Nations team urgently consulted with South Korea, Australia and New Zealand and proposed providing Taiwan with additional communications and security assistance, which it provided later in the game. In a public statement, the Allied Space Nations team announced the deployment of multiple U.S. naval vessels, including a carrier strike group, and hinted at potential economic sanctions against China. However, it stopped short of taking any offensive military actions against China, opting instead to focus on diplomatic measures and military readiness.

The team pledged to assist Taiwan with cable repairs and represent OneWeb in its legal counterclaim against China. The team also discussed contracting with Starlink to establish new ground stations on the island to provide it with service.

Taiwan was disappointed that Washington refused to take proportionate military action against China. The Allied Space Nation team reassured Taiwan that it was considering such responses but did not yet believe casus belli was clear enough.

Move three

At the start of move three, a significant conjunction event occurs in LEO between a U.S. military reconnaissance satellite and a Chinese space-debris removal satellite. Both sustain minor damage but continue to operate. The U.S. suspects deliberate provocation by China.

The Chinese Coast Guard then impounds three vessels flagged under Liberia, Panama and Greece that attempt to enter Taiwan’s ports without notifying the Chinese authorities. The respective countries lodge diplomatic protests, demanding China immediately release the ships and crews. 

Persistent power outages across Taiwan lead to critical failure of cellular communication systems, as the island’s cell towers exhaust their backup generators and batteries. The island’s population, already stressed by intermittent internet services and information blackouts, plunges into deeper confusion and panic. 

Finally, Chinese fighter interceptors shot and damaged a U.S. Air Force C-17 Globemaster III that the Allied Space Nation team had sent to provide emergency generators, water purification supplies and materials to help rebuild damaged ground stations. This was supposed to be the first flight in a “Berlin Airlift” of relief to Taiwan. Damaged, the plane flew back to Okinawa. The team then contracted with foreign flag carriers to deliver aid with American, Japanese, Australian and Indian naval escorts.

OneWeb team:
The Eutelsat OneWeb team remained unmoved by the continuing tensions between the U.S., Taiwan and China. 

Rather than responding to these new crises, the team discussed reassuring shareholders and launching states of Eutelsat OneWeb’s neutrality. It considered conducting a market analysis to understand the effects of supporting or not supporting Taiwan and weighed the possibility of buying out Taiwan’s shares or refusing future contracts in Taiwan. The team also discussed using U.K. law to alter their rules and procedures to eliminate Chinese influence over Eutelsat OneWeb policy decisions.

Reflecting on their inability to rapidly deploy emergency communications, the team proposed the U.S. organize a task force of commercial entities to respond. This task force might stockpile materials and plan rapid deployment for potential high-conflict zones during peacetime. The team also highlighted the need for a multinational body combining states and corporations to establish rules and norms for safe navigation and operations in space.

Taiwan team:
In move three, Taiwan continued to struggle to reestablish reliable communications or electrical power throughout the island. The team hoped to utilize Taiwan’s preparedness planning for natural disasters to deploy short-range communications resources — HAM radios, VHF radios and walkie-talkies — to reestablish limited communications and provide relief. However, these efforts were disorganized and did not perform as originally planned. The team also asked USAID for fuel, generators and water purification supplies, hoping China would permit delivery as humanitarian aid.

Allied Space Nation team:
After the Chinese assault on America’s C-17, Washington publicly condemned the act as an act of war. Recognizing that restraint was no longer realistic or viable, the Allied Space Nations team began advocating for terrestrial military action. The team demanded the release of the three impounded foreign ships within 48 hours, declaring the detention illegal under international law, and threatened U.S. naval interference if the ships were not released. They simultaneously enforced a maritime exclusion zone along China’s mainland coast with naval assistance from the U.K., South Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand.

In response to the most recent conjunction between a U.S. military satellite and a Chinese satellite in LEO, the Allied Space Nations team finally decided to take offensive action against China’s space assets. The team decided to secretly conduct cyberattacks on China’s BeiDou satellites. Suspecting U.S. operations, China retaliated by conducting similar cyberattacks against American GPS satellites and cutting the main undersea communications cable to Guam using a submarine. The Allied Space Nations team responded by redoubling cyber strikes against China’s BeiDou satellites.

These attacks — the first and only hostile actions taken by the U.S. during the game — seemed to rattle the China team. In response, Beijing demanded the U.S. cease its provocations in space, disband its maritime exclusion zone and allow the Chinese Navy to take over enforcement of the customs regime from the Chinese Coast Guard. The China team also made its first diplomatic offer of the game: China would be willing to withdraw its naval forces on the condition that the U.S. officially recognize Taiwan as part of China and help negotiate an amicable customs system protecting China’s rights.

The Allied Space Nations team had not anticipated this diplomatic overture and failed to prepare a counter negotiation. The team refused to accept China’s terms and demanded that China end its military aggression, allow normal communications and trade with Taiwan and return to the status quo. At this point in gameplay, neither the China team nor the Allied Space Nations team seemed ready to engage diplomatically. Further military escalation seemed likely.

Henry Sokolski is the executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center in Arlington, VA, served as Deputy for Nonproliferation Policy in the Cheney Pentagon, and is the author of “China, Russia, and the Coming Cool War.”

Henry Sokolski is executive director of The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center in Arlington, Virginia, and served as Deputy for Nonproliferation Policy in the Cheney Pentagon.