WASHINGTON — Lockheed Martin is challenging the prevailing narrative that military users of the Global Positioning System (GPS) are dangerously vulnerable to service disruptions and is emphasizing the advanced security features set to debut with the upcoming GPS IIIF satellites.
GPS has become a critical infrastructure that touches nearly every aspect of modern life and military operations. While GPS is widely viewed as an indispensable backbone of the global economy, it is simultaneously seen as a fragile technological system vulnerable to sophisticated electronic warfare techniques and signal disruption.
Jesse Morehouse, Lockheed Martin’s director of business development and strategy for positioning navigation and timing, said this narrative overlooks security upgrades and technological innovations being developed to enhance GPS.
Concerns about GPS vulnerabilities have escalated since 2022, fueled by increasing reports of jamming and spoofing incidents. Jamming disrupts GPS signals, while spoofing falsifies them, potentially leading users astray. Media reports have spotlighted the relatively low cost of equipment needed to disrupt GPS signals, amplifying concerns about the system’s fragility.
In response, the Pentagon has launched initiatives to mitigate these vulnerabilities. A key focus is reducing dependence on GPS by integrating alternative positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) technologies that are being developed by the commercial industry.
Lockheed Martin, which produces GPS satellites but not the ground systems or user equipment, is countering claims of systemic weakness, particularly for military users. Morehouse underscored the distinction between civilian and military GPS signals, particularly the advanced military M-code signal.
“M-code is very difficult, if not impossible, to spoof,” Morehouse said at a recent Lockheed Martin news conference. While jamming remains a threat, he clarified that spoofing concerns primarily apply to civilian signals. “You could try to steer a commercial airliner off path, but you couldn’t steer a missile off the path,” he explained.
The next generation of satellites include enhanced security features such as the Regional Military Protection signal, which is more powerful and resistant to jamming, he said. However, some key features will remain underutilized until modernized ground systems and user receivers — developed by other contractors — are fully deployed, a process that has been plagued by delays.
The next evolution
GPS satellites are a cornerstone of Lockheed Martin’s space portfolio. In 2018, the company secured a $7.2 billion contract to produce up to 22 GPS IIIF satellites. Several are already in production.
For civilians, the next evolution is the L5 signal, a more powerful and precise channel that will be particularly valuable for commercial aviation. However, this capability requires additional satellites in orbit and updated control systems before it can be fully operational.
For the military, GPS IIIF promises jam-resistant features and increased signal power. The first GPS IIIF satellite is scheduled to launch in 2027.
Complicating the discussion around GPS vulnerabilities is the Department of the Air Force’s Resilient GPS (R-GPS) program. This initiative aims to supplement the existing GPS system with smaller, lower-cost satellites based on commercial designs. The Space Systems Command plans to launch up to eight R-GPS satellites by 2028, with additional launches planned in phases.
The program, which has engaged companies like Astranis, Axient, L3Harris and Sierra Space, is designed to provide a subset of GPS signals that are compatible with both military and civilian receivers.
The Space Systems Command has said that R-GPS is not a replacement for GPS but rather an added layer of resilience.
Jeff Schrader, vice president of strategy and business development at Lockheed Martin Space, stressed that the new program is not in competition with GPS IIIF. “You won’t hear the Space Force say R-GPS is replacing GPS,” Schrader said. “What they say is that we are going to work together.”
Morehouse warned about what he sees as an overblown narrative of systemic risk in GPS. “There’s a lot more nuance to it than GPS magically going away one day.” The system’s robustness, he argues, is often under-appreciated.
