After a year of high-level diplomacy, relations between China and the West are no longer in free fall. And yet China’s somewhat warmer outward posture belies it becoming a more closed society at home. President Xi Jinping’s predecessors anticipated China’s so-called great rejuvenation would be attained through economic growth. Xi, by contrast, believes that if China is to realize its ambitions as a global superpower, national security is paramount.
Faced with an array of internal problems, state censorship has been ratcheted into overdrive. Wary of espionage, Beijing is taking ever more extreme measures to restrict the flow of information. But a more opaque China could impair decision-making about its actions within the global economy and international order. This impairment also includes decision-making ability around the development and preservation of space for the common good.
Indeed, in a lecture broadcasted during the 20th National Congress of the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in October 2022, Xi Jinping warned that “external attempts to suppress and contain China may escalate at any time.” The gathering also served to showcase the Chinese leader’s consolidation of absolute control over his party. Loyal ultranationalists were rewarded with cabinet positions, sidelining any viable opposition to Xi’s policies.
By silencing moderate perspectives, hawkish voices that align with Xi Jinping’s zero-sum mindset are now shaping China’s space agenda — as well as related propaganda for domestic consumption.
Accessing knowledge and diverse perspectives in modern China has long been challenging. The CCP has positioned itself as the primary arbiter of political, economic and social life since the People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949. There has never been press freedom. By strictly curbing expression, the party ensures it retains its monopoly on power.
But the suppression of information has gotten progressively worse since the COVID-19 pandemic. China’s government is still stonewalling attempts to determine the virus’s origins. Beijing’s draconian zero-COVID policies also created a blueprint for authoritarian states to restrict civil liberties under the guise of public health measures. China’s digital surveillance apparatus continues to expand as well. The premise is that abolishing privacy will improve service delivery.
Geopolitical rivalries are contributing too. China’s Ministry of State Security announced in February that it would start monitoring outbound data flows more closely. This reportedly includes information around plane tracking, weather monitoring and users’ pinned map locations. Government officials last year raided the offices of several foreign companies, allegedly for stealing state secrets. Most of those targeted were consulting and due diligence firms that gathered information about China that was useful for external investors and multinational businesses. Among the sweeping reforms to Beijing’s state secrets law that took effect on May 1 were vague new rules that make the sharing of “work secrets” a punishable offence.
In some ways, this is a natural evolution. The CCP severed China’s ties to the outside world for decades when it first came to power. And biographers argue that President Xi Jinping’s priorities are driven by his formative years during the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. The experience apparently imprinted on him an overriding desire for party discipline and social order.
But the crackdown on free expression also appears to stem from China’s diminished economic trajectory. A property sector crash, birth rate crisis, trade frictions, plummeting foreign investment, mass youth unemployment, the ballooning debt of local governments and struggles to transition to a consumer-based economy all have taken a toll. And fissures in Beijing’s governance model are emerging.
Xi Jinping is gambling that increasing state support for high-end manufacturing exports can jumpstart China’s economy, particularly with items needed for the green energy transition. But should the Chinese leader’s plan falter, China’s restless citizenry will likely find ever more creative outlets for dissent.
In February, Chinese netizens flooded a social media post about giraffes on the U.S. embassy’s Weibo page with over 165,000 comments slamming a $7 trillion drop in value of the Shanghai Stock Exchange. During pandemic lockdowns, a Chinese student studying abroad used his X account (then Twitter) to crowdsource and repost acts of dissent in China under the avatar of a cartoon cat. The China Dissent Monitor, a project of the U.S.-based democracy watchdog Freedom House, similarly compiles data and visual highlights of civil disobedience across the country.
Make no mistake: The Chinese state is nowhere near a risk of collapse. But turning the world’s second-largest economy around will take time. Meanwhile, Beijing is expected to crack down ever harder on civil society. Ironically, this will make it more difficult for the government to accurately assess the situation within its own borders.
And this all comes as concerns are growing over Beijing’s apparent progress in weaponizing space to its advantage. The head of U.S. Space Command warned the Senate Armed Services Committee in February that China’s orbital military capabilities are already advancing at a “breathtaking pace.”
Should Xi Jinping find himself in need of a unifying distraction from domestic turmoil in the months and years ahead, look for China to become more overtly jingoistic in space. For the benefit of everyone, the West must avoid playing into his hands by retaliating in kind.
Kyle Hiebert is an independent political risk analyst and contributing writer for the Centre for International Governance Innovation, located in Canada. He was formerly based in Cape Town and Johannesburg as the deputy editor of the Africa Conflict Monitor.
