Chairman and Members of the Committee:

It is an honor to
appear before you representing the outstanding men and
women of North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)
and United States Space Command (USSPACECOM). Over the
last year, I have observed, first hand, the pride,
dedication and excellence of the professionals who work
in our commands. Because of them, North America enjoys
freedom and security today, and the United States
continues to lead the world in space. We are proud to be
part of the national security team.

For 43 years NORAD has
met the changing threat -transitioning from an initial
"air" defense orientation to a broader
aerospace dimension -one that provides surveillance
and warning of ballistic missile attack and space events
and ensures our air sovereignty against an expanding
range of potential threats including terrorists and drug
smugglers. NORAD missions remain as vital as ever and
constitute a critical component of the defense of North

USSPACECOM, established
in 1985, serves as the single point of contact for all
military space operational matters. According to the
Unified Command Plan, we are charged with advocating
space operations and missile warning requirements for
all Commanders In Chief (CINCs). We conduct space
operations through the mission areas of space support,
force enhancement, space control, and force application
and support strategic ballistic missile defense for the
United States. In addition, we are tasked to plan for
and develop requirements for strategic ballistic missile
defense, space-based support for tactical ballistic
missile defense and space operations. In coordination
with the Joint Staff and appropriate CINCs, USSPACECOM
provides military representation to US national
agencies, commercial, and international agencies for
matters related to military space operations unless
otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense. Most
recently, USSPACECOM has been identified as the military
lead for DoD’s computer network defense (CND) and
computer network attack (CNA) missions. Ten years after
the Gulf War, we see the huge advantage space brings to
our warfighting capabilities. Our efforts to "operationalize"
space have enabled us to move time-critical information
to front-line commanders and to troops in the field.
These efforts were crucial to our success during U.S.
and allied air operations over Serbia. Space-based
capabilities have become an integral part of our
American military operations.

As our reliance on
space increases, we believe more attention should be
devoted to developing policies and methods that protect
our access to, and use of, space. In a similar way, we
must protect our critical information infrastructure to
assure information superiority (our Nation’s Global
Information Grid) and develop appropriate strategies to
exploit the vulnerabilities of our adversaries’ space
and computer network capabilities. To meet the unique
challenges of our evolving national security
environment, we must remain the world leader in space
and computer network operations.

For fiscal year 2002,
the President’s budget includes funding to cover our
most pressing priorities. However, the programs
discussed in this statement and their associated funding
levels and schedules may change as a result of the
Secretary of Defense’s strategy review, which will
guide future decisions on military spending.

People Are Fundamental to Our Success

Execution of our
National Military Strategy hinges on our ability to
attract and retain high quality, motivated servicemen
and women and civilian employees. Our tremendous
warfighting capability depends on our people. If we take
care of them, they will take care of our mission.
Without them, even our most effective weapon systems are
of little value. Congress’ initiatives to improve
military and civilian pay, health care and housing for
our professionals in uniform are making a real
difference. We are very grateful for your continued
support in these areas. However, we still have work to

Our biggest challenges
continue to be recruiting and retention. For USSPACECOM,
recruiting is especially important as we seek a balanced
mix of military and civilian talent to meet our space
mission requirements and new obligations with CND and
CNA. Finding this talent continues to be a difficult job
as we compete with industry for people with high-demand
space and information technology skills.

Compared to recruiting,
the issue of retention poses an even more formidable
task. Our organization is feeling the pressure that
stems from the combination of a strong economy and
industry’s demand for the unique technical skill and
work ethic found in our people. High-paying civilian
jobs that offer stability and exceptional benefits
continue to lure our people away from the military.

Last fall, Congress
made significant progress in helping us turn the tide by
authorizing targeted pay raises for our mid-career
enlisted members and extending the Thrift Savings Plan
to members of the Armed Services. We are most grateful
for this support. To continue in the right direction, we
also need to focus on developing our future space
leaders and build incentives to keep them on board.
Specifically, we must cultivate their talents, pique
their interest, develop their core space expertise and
expand their knowledge base through Joint and
Service-specific professional development programs.

Finally, last
year, we asked Congress to repeal the FY00
congressionally mandated 15% reduction in staff
personnel at our Unified Headquarters. The FY01 National
Defense Authorization Act offered some relief to this
mandate by reducing the personnel cuts to 7.5%. In
USSPACECOM, we remain concerned about the possibility of
losing 79 billets after we have just assumed our new CND
and CNA missions for national security systems. Given
our current plans, as we establish the infrastructure to
support our new assignments, any manpower reduction will
adversely affect our ability to fulfill our unified
command duties.


It is encouraging to
see how our Nation’s warfighting capabilities have
improved over the last decade. As mentioned earlier,
space systems are now integrated into virtually every
aspect of our military operations and are essential to
our success, whether in peace, crisis, or armed
conflict. Our increasing dependence on space dictates
the need to continue modernizing our space systems,
which, in turn, will have a direct effect on our overall
military readiness. In addition, we must leverage the
benefits associated with partnerships–both within the
government and with industry. Finally, we must improve
the way military space is organized and managed in order
to realize the full potential of our Nation’s space

Missile Warning.
missile warning continues to be "Job 1." With
the development and proliferation of theater ballistic
missiles, it is clear we need the improved detection
capabilities of the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS)
soonest. This system-of-systems will enhance our early
warning and space surveillance capabilities, support
future ballistic missile defense systems and provide
commanders with better battlefield situational

SBIRS will serve as a
combat multiplier for our Nation’s military and our
allies. The SBIRS High satellites will improve theater
missile launch point and impact point predictions and
will provide data that assists in performing missions
such as real-time battle damage assessment. As for SBIRS
Low, we believe the system should be designed to support
and improve missile defense. However, we also believe we
need to implement "smart upgrades"ó-supported
by cost-benefit analysis–that will maximize both the
SBIRS High and SBIRS Low inherent capabilities to
support technical intelligence, battlespace
characterization and space surveillance.

Because our theater
forces are already at risk and because we expect
proliferation of more accurate theater ballistic
missiles, we strongly advocate SBIRS as our top priority
new system. We appreciate the congressional support we
have received for this very important program. We remain
committed to a launch of the first SBIRS High
geosynchronous orbiting satellite in fiscal year 2005,
followed by the first SBIRS Low launch in 2006.

SBIRS is the foundation of our future missile warning
capabilities. However, we must not overlook the value of
fusion technology. The Theater Airborne Warning System
and the Enhanced Early Warning System will work in
conjunction with the space-based Defense Support Program
and SBIRS to provide our theater warfighters enhanced
protection from theater ballistic missile attacks. These
systems will fuse space and airborne infrared sensor and
radar phenomenology to improve warning times
dramatically and increase launch and impact point
accuracy. We appreciate your continued support for these
important programs.

Force Enhancement.
Our force
enhancement efforts over the last decade have helped us
"operationalize" space. Global Positioning
System (GPS) navigation satellites and our Satellite
Communications (SATCOM) systems are fully integrated
into the warfighting capabilities of all our Services.
The readiness of our military forces depends on the
modernization of these systems.

GPS has become a way of
life for both our military and commercial industry
around the world. As a result, we have initiated a
modernization program that will provide warfighters a
more robust anti-jam capability and enhance civil
signals for aviation, safety-of-life services and other
commercial enterprises. We appreciate Congress’
continued support in sustaining and modernizing this
national resource.

Reliable and secure
SATCOM systems are also key to our military’s state of
readiness. We continue to exploit our current SATCOM
fleet while developing new, technologically advanced
systems. Over the past year, we worked with the other
Commanders in Chief to revalidate SATCOM requirements.
We reaffirmed the need to modernize our capabilities
with a blend of military, civil and commercial systems.
As we update our satellites, we cannot forget the user
terminals. All aspects of SATCOM must be synchronized
for maximum utility. We need your continued support to
make this critical modernization effort a reality.

Over the past decade, a
significant amount of radio frequency spectrum has been
reallocated from federal use, with the DoD as the
primary user, to the Federal Communications Commission
for auction to the private sector. Our space systems
depend upon the spectrum to perform our missions. In
order to maintain our state of readiness, we need to
carefully consider the national security implications of
spectrum reallocations. The FY99 Defense Authorization
Act restored some of the spectrum previously reallocated
from Federal use. We appreciate Congress’ help;
however, we face continued requests for expanded
non-federal civil and commercial use of this limited
spectrum. For instance, there is a proposal being
considered to accelerate the reallocation of the Space
Ground Link Subsystem frequency, which supports our
on-orbit satellite systems. If this proposal is
implemented without adequate alternative spectrum for
critical military functions, it will limit our ability
to effectively command and control our space assets. In
addition, we request careful consideration of the
testing results and analyses of new wireless
technologies below 3 GHz such as Ultra Wide Band (UWB)
systems. We must ensure these new technologies and
systems do not impact the GPS signal that is so critical
to military and civil positioning, navigation and

Space Support.
Our space support missions focus on launching satellites
and then operating and maintaining them once in orbit.
The Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) is our next
generation launch vehicle that will provide assured
access to space with quicker response and greater
flexibility at a significantly reduced cost. We are
pleased to report this program is on track with the
first launch scheduled for 2002.

In addition to
modernizing our launch vehicles, we are upgrading the
ranges that support our Nation’s military, civil and
commercial space launches. Our Range Standardization and
Automation program will standardize launch interfaces,
replace obsolescent technology and help reduce
operations and maintenance costs while increasing
operational flexibility.

Force Protection.
Members of our
USSPACECOM team deploy to virtually every location where
U.S. forces operate; therefore, force protection is
critical. To the best of our ability, we must
proactively safeguard our people and facilities by
heightening awareness, continuing to conduct regular
anti-terrorism training, assessing and correcting our
own vulnerabilities, and finally, educating our people
to be constantly on guard. We do not view force
protection as a mission unto itself but inherent in all
that we do.

With the ever-increasing demand for space support, we
recognize the need to expand relationships with our
"space partners" to leverage existing systems
and national level expertise. USSPACECOM and the
National Reconnaissance Office continue to explore the
possibility of common space systems and seek new avenues
to better support both the warfighter and national user.
In addition, we are working with the National Imagery
and Mapping Agency to develop imagery requirements and
with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
to better predict the location of space objects and
improve human spaceflight safety. Finally, through our
partnerships with other agencies, we are investigating
ways to collectively support our CND and CNA missions.

Similarly, we recognize
the need to partner with industry. To sustain our
readiness, we need to balance the advantages of
commercial partnerships with the inherent risks
associated with expanding our use of commercial systems.
We do this by continually assessing our vulnerabilities
and ensuring protected military systems are available
for our most critical military missions.

Space Commission.
The Commission to Assess United States National Security
Space Management and Organization submitted its report
in January 2001. We are pleased with the findings and
believe the Commission made solid recommendations to
improve the way military space is organized and managed.
We concur with the Secretary of Defense’s assessment
of the report and are working with his staff to
implement the recommendations.

Accomplishments in 2000

Our people remain
focused and continue to accomplish the mission despite
our high operations tempo. In calendar year 2000, our
space wings successfully executed 27 launches and
deployed all payloads to their respective orbits for a
100% success rate. In addition, we recently activated
two new squadrons with space control missions. We have
made significant strides in establishing the framework
for our CND and CNA missions and have conducted several
space and information operations-based exercises to
demonstrate our adversaries’ capabilities and to
identify our own vulnerabilities. The following provides
a more detailed description of our activities during the
past year:

Our people
need to train as they fight. To ensure our forces are
fully prepared to defend against attacks on our
space-based infrastructure, we have recently activated
two new squadrons–the 527th Space Aggressor
Squadron and the 76th Space Control Squadron.
The 527th Space Aggressor Squadron’s
mission is to replicate the known capabilities of
potential adversaries and play the role of the "red
team" in exercises like Schriever 2001. The 76th
Space Control Squadron’s charter is to explore future
space control technologies by testing models and
prototypes of counterspace systems with the goal of
rapidly achieving space superiority.

Computer Network
Defense and Computer Network Attack.

The threat to DoD computer networks and systems
continues to grow. If used properly, a cyber attack
offers less militarily capable nations an asymmetric
means to degrade the effectiveness of our military
forces. As a result, protecting our critical information
infrastructure (the Global Information Grid) continues
to be USSPACECOM’s main focus in the cyber arena.

We are working hard to
normalize our CND mission. We established a command and
control structure, initiated efforts to improve the
dissemination of critical CND information and
established reporting and tracking procedures for
protecting and defending critical national security
information systems (the Global Information Grid.) Our
challenge is to stay ahead of evolving threats to our
computer networks, keep abreast of rapidly changing
technology and continue coordinating closely with other
government agencies.

On 1 October 2000, the
Unified Command Plan designated USSPACECOM the
"military lead" for DoD’s CNA activities.
Our initial focus has been on the development of a CNA
concept of operations that addresses the process needed
to integrate CNA capabilities into existing operation
and contingency plans. Our challenge is two-fold. First,
we must understand the CNA needs of the other CINCs and
determine the best way to address them. Second, we need
to continue developing CNA strategies through
simulations and wargaming to improve our understanding
of the potential collateral effects associated with such

On 2 April 2001, we
transitioned our CND and CNA missions to an
organizational construct we call the Joint Task Force
for Computer Network Operations (JTF-CNO). Combining our
newest missions under a single operational commander
enables unity of command and effort. In addition, the
JTF-CNO makes more efficient use of available resources,
eases coordination with the intelligence community and
other partners and establishes a clear cross-agency
coordination process. We see the JTF-CNO as a
"pathfinder" organization that will adapt to
changing threats and to the expansion of its mission

Space, Information
Operations and Missile Defense Exercises.

Over the past year, we have continued to focus on
integrating space and information-based capabilities
into Service and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff-sponsored exercises and experiments. Last year’s
Joint Warrior Interoperability Demonstration showed how
space has become a fundamental part of our business.
Space-based capabilities are not a luxury anymore; they
are now integral to military operations.

In December 2000, we
co-sponsored, with the Ballistic Missile Defense
Organization, another of our annual Ballistic Missile
Defense of North America Command and Control Simulations
(C2 Sims) primarily to refine and validate our Concept
of Operations. This was the first C2 Sim where we
investigated the integration and interoperability of the
offensive and defensive missions. We found the C2 Sim to
be very valuable and are working to expand the
involvement of CINCs to capitalize on relationships
between these missions so we can ultimately execute them
in a synergistic fashion.

In 2001, Army Space
Command supported an exercise to vet space contributions
to the overall Army Transformation wargame and Air Force
Space Command sponsored Schriever 2001, the first-ever
Air Force wargame dedicated to space. The Schriever 2001
wargame explored space warfare issues and investigated
the military utility of our future space systems. The
preliminary analysis of the results reinforced several
key points we have known for some time: a robust
"blue" space capability serves as an effective
deterrent; the "blue" team is very dependent
on space and, as a result, is potentially vulnerable to
"red" counterspace actions; and finally,
commercial space serves as a powerful force multiplier.

Our Way

As we prepare for an
uncertain future, we must focus our attention on
protecting and advancing our interests in space and
information-based operations or run the very real risk
of a "Space Pearl Harbor" or another
"Sputnik" that catches us off-guard and

Space Control.
Since the activation of U. S. Space Command in 1985, we
have focussed on integrating space with warfighting:
bringing space to the warfighter. Setting our
"integration throttle" at maximum has served
us well. Today, nearly every endeavor across the
spectrum of military operations utilizes space to

However, our reliance
upon space has become a vulnerability. Potential
adversaries are watching and responding. They see space
as an asymmetric method for leveling the playing field.
Not only are threats emerging on a daily basis, but
cheap access to advanced commercial space services
continues to chip away at our information superiority

Therefore, it is time
to push up the "space superiority throttle."
We have left this throttle at idle for too long. The
reasons range from resources and technological maturity
to legal and policy limitations; but the time has come.
We must prepare now to ensure our continued access to
space, to deny space to others, if necessary, and help
assure the continued use of space for the Nation’s
$60B commercial investment.

Space is important
enough to warrant a significant investmentó-it is not
just a higher hill. This is a medium crucial to our
American military operations and one we’ll have to
fight for in the future.

Space-Based Laser.
The Space Based Laser (SBL) could provide worldwide,
continuous, boost-phase intercept across a wide range of
ballistic missile defense scenarios. Warfighting CINCs
recognize SBL’s inherent capability to support other
DoD missions such as air defense, global surveillance,
space control and target detection. We must continue to
pursue the technologies associated with systems like the
SBL. The mere fact that the United States is developing
means to employ force in space may serve as a
significant deterrent.

Space-Based Radar.
Space-Based Radar (SBR) is a force enhancement system we
must explore. The requirement for SBR capability remains
high. Our national and military strategies are based on
global engagement. As such, our military operations
require the day, night, and all weather broad-area
surveillance capabilities this system could offer. We
were moving forward with an SBR demonstration system,
Discoverer II, until it was terminated last fall. In
response to the FY01 DoD Authorization Conference
Report, the National Security Space Architect is leading
a multi-service, multi-agency effort to develop an SBR
Roadmap, which brings together requirements for both the
DoD and national users. As part of the Roadmap
development, we are heavily involved in an analysis of
alternatives that will allow the DoD leadership to make
SBR decisions in concert with decisions being made on
other intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance

Computer Network
Defense and Computer Network Attack.

We will continue to facilitate and lead the DoD-wide
effort for CND and CNA. We intend to fully integrate
these options into all military plans and operations,
focusing on positive command and control, integrated
planning and deconfliction, fully coordinated
intelligence support and execution of assigned missions.

Ballistic Missile
With the proliferation of missile technology, one of our
primary concerns is the threat of strategic ballistic
missiles. A defensive capability is required to protect
North America. As part of our unified command
responsibilities for ballistic missile defense, we
continue our work to establish clear system requirements
and develop the necessary procedures and command and
control options for an operational capability.


I assure you, NORAD and
USSPACECOM are prepared to provide aerospace defense to
the people of North America and space support to U.S.
and allied armed forces. We have successfully integrated
space capabilities and computer network defense and
attack into all aspects of our military tactics and
continue to find new ways to improve our warfighting
capabilities. As we develop our next generation systems,
we must invest the necessary resources and intellectual
capital to protect our vital interests and sustain our
lead in space. We appreciate Congress’ continued
support to maintain our high state of readiness. With
your help, we will ensure space forces play a key role
in our Nation’s future defense.

Again, I am honored to
appear before you and look forward to your questions.