OpEd: Beyond “Back to Basics”

W




ith the departure of U.S. Air Force Undersecretary Ron Sega from the Pentagon, it is time to start thinking about the best way




the nation can




proceed
to




the next phase of military space acquisition.

Sega focused on a “back-to-basics” approach to return military space acquisition from a




financial and technological abyss. The system was out of whack with spiral development leading to spiraling costs and non-existent space platforms. His emphasis was on putting platforms into space rather than crafting transformational briefing slides. He focused on more realistic program cost estimates




and block upgrades of existing platforms.

With Sega out of the way, the temptation will be to push forward breakthrough programs




that are big on promise, but




likely to deliver




little




capability to orbit very quickly. Leveraging current platforms to create capabilities is considerably better than crafting comprehensive systems that are unaffordable and beyond the technological grasp of the current generations of engineers and manufacturers.

While




back to basics




was putting military space back on more solid financial and technological footing, several strategic developments occurred that




should shape a new military space approach.




These developments should lead to an emphasis on a systems approach, rather than on advancing a purely proprietary military space sector.

First, the military deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan have underscored the need for




a new approach to the use of command and control (C2) and




intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR).




These operations have relied on air-breathing and ground-based platforms to provide significant C2 and ISR. The U.S. Marine Corps




is relying on what it




calls “non-traditional” ISR for its




operations. By non-traditional, t




he




Marine Corps means




“on-demand” ISR for




ground- and sea-based decision makers.




Air-breathing platforms, whether manned or unmanned, are increasingly central to their




ISR and C2 operations.




The Marines




and U.S. Army have worked closely to share data across ground-based systems as well.

With the dramatically enhanced








role of C2 and ISR generated by the ground-air partnership, the role of space has




changed. Space becomes a significant layer within the communications and data spheres, not simply




the repository of the network. Space systems become relay elements, coordinating nodes




and part




of a collaborative system, not the dominant layer shaping the network. This means that the U.S. military can shift from building complete military communications and ISR networks in space to leveraging the evolution of air-breathing and ground systems as well as global commercial systems




in shaping its future military space system.

Second, the operations associated with the global war on terrorism




have underscored the changing nature of the balance between kinetic and non-kinetic systems. For example,




the U.S. Air Force’s primary operational missions now are largely non-kinetic.




Kinetic strike is a core capability to be exercised as appropriate.

Air Force Secretary Mike Wynne refers to this new state of affairs as the role of the




Air Force in the “global security enterprise.” The classic role of military space has been to provide C4ISR for kinetic strike against moving or static tactical or strategic targets. With the global




war on terrorism, there are fewer targets and significantly more events that need to be shaped on the ground or at sea. Data and communications need to be provided close to the point of decision




making, not stored in Washington data vaults. As such, the military and security players in the global security enterprise are relying more on a collaborative and




on-demand




networks than on the data provided from distant




geostationary satellites.

Third, the global security enterprise rests in the words Wynne wrote in a Jan. 16 op-ed for Aviation Week:




“




The thoughtful shaping of coalition capabilities that will provide the authority within which power may be exercised in the turbulent years ahead.”




This means that a premium is placed from the outset on shared capabilities, not proprietary data provided by U.S. military systems, which then is laundered through a tortured intelligence sharing process with allies. By then events are beyond the point where there is any relevance to




the data.




Proprietary U.S. military systems are at the core of shaping kinetic capabilities for the joint U.S. forces, but




they are not at the heart of the shared data and communications capability that are central to




the global security enterprise and needed for an effective




global war on terrorism.

This means that relying on shared systems with allies and the commercial sector should be a core consideration for a significant part of the U.S. military space system. On the one hand, data can be purchased from partners and allies. For example, leased communications from the United Kingdom’s




Skynet
system would be part of the U.S. overall capability.

On the other hand,




the Defense Department needs to rely




on commercial networks and systems for capabilities and those needs should




be prioritized. This could be done by leasing services directly, by relying on hosted payloads (




as the




U.S. Federal Aviation Administration does currently), or by leveraging networks like Iridium to support GPS. Rather than viewing the commercial networks as a leper colony




, the Pentagon should




view the commercial sector as a core element of the overall military space system.

A final key consideration is the impact of the Chinese anti




-satellite




test. The Chinese have demonstrated the vulnerability of space. By relying on commercial systems that the Chinese would be loath to degrade and by building capabilities that leverage the collaborative capabilities of a redundant data and communications global network deployed locally, the Pentagon would get the redundancy that




provides security.

In other words, the Sega pause has allowed the Pentagon to begin thinking realistically about a military space system, not a military space sector. A systems approach recognizes the role of the various contributors to overall capabilities providing for the effects necessary to shape and execute a global security enterprise. It would be a shame if




back to basics




will now be replaced by




back to business




as usual with Sega out of the picture.

Robbin

Laird is a Washington- and Paris-based defense aerospace consulta




nt.