President’s Science Advisor Clarifies Plan for Sensitive Research

WASHINGTON, D.C. – The President’s Science Advisor, Dr. John Marburger, today told the House Science
Committee that the Administration was not considering a policy of “pre-publication review” of sensitive federally funded research. 

“I’m aware that there is an impression that the administration is considering a policy of pre-publication review of sensitive federally funded research,” said Dr. Marburger.  “This is incorrect – this is not the thrust of the considerations, and it’s important to note that this process is in the formative stage.” 

Critics pre-publication review fear that it could lead to a stifling of scientific research.  Dr. Marburger delivered the remarks at a hearing on “Conducting Research During the War on Terrorism: Balancing Openness and Security.”

House Science Committee Chairman Sherwood Boehlert (R-NY) opened the hearing by saying “The war on terrorism will be won in the laboratory just as much as on the battlefield.” But he noted that this “highlights some critical tensions that the war on terrorism has brought to a head.  For if the laboratory is a theater of war, then what are its rules of engagement?  War demands secrecy; science thrives on openness.  How can a free society balance those competing demands?”

Ranking Member Ralph M. Hall (D-TX) added, “We must ensure that we don’t help train the enemy.  We did just that for the 9-11 cowards by allowing them to go to flight schools.  If we do that again with biological or chemical agents the price would be unthinkable.”

In response to questions from Chairman Boehlert, witnesses from across the research community said that there should not be a category for “sensitive but unclassified research.”  The panel argued that such a category would hamper the openness necessary for the scientific enterprise to thrive.  Dr. M.R.C. Greenwood, Chancellor of the University of California at Santa Cruz, stated, “The best way to sort out these issues is to work directly with experts in the various scientific fields and scientific societies.  The experts are well equipped to help determine if something is sensitive or dangerous and may need to be withheld from the public domain for any amount of time by classifying the work.”

Dr. Ronald Atlas, President of the American Society for Microbiology, added, “It is my strong belief that the scientific community will act responsibly, that we will develop self-policing measures, and that we can work together with the national security community to ensure the protection of the public while our scientific research continues.”

Marburger also discussed the plans for the Administration’s Interagency Panel on Science and Security (IPASS) program to address concerns regarding international students.  IPASS will focus on graduate students and will evaluate each student to determine what, if any, danger the student might pose to security.  Generally, witnesses and members agreed that many questions still remain to be answered as IPASS is implemented.

Dr. Greenwood noted that “we are no longer the only nation that can provide access to specialized information,” and pointed out that European nations produce more PhDs that the U.S., and Asian nations are approximately even with the U.S.  “Thus, in some ways, expressed concerns about preventing international students from studying ‘sensitive’ areas is a modern version of closing the barn door after the horse has left. We would be much better advised to strengthen our overall science and technology enterprise than to try to restrict access,” said Greenwood.

Research Subcommittee Ranking Member Eddie Bernice Johnson (D-TX) said, “The Department of Homeland Security legislation which passed the House did not include my amendment, which passed the Science Committee by nearly a two-to-one margin, to harmonize the classification procedures between the new Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense.  Not only does this inconsistency send conflicting messages to our nation’s scientists, but it goes against the testimony of today’s expert witnesses, all of whom endorsed the directive upon which it was based, National Security Decision Directive 189.  I look forward to working with my colleagues on the Science Committee to rectify this situation.”

Chairman Boehlert’s opening statement follows this release.  Witness testimony and an archived web cast of the hearing can be found at www.house.gov/science.

CHAIRMAN SHERWOOD BOEHLERT (R-NY) OPENING STATEMENT FOR SECURITY HEARING

October 10, 2002

I’d like to welcome everyone here today to this vitally important hearing.  I believe this is the first hearing Congress has held since September 11th on this central question of balancing security and openness in the conduct of research.

As everyone here knows, I am fond of pointing out that “the war on terrorism will be won in the laboratory just as much as on the battlefield.”  I’ve made that line my byword to argue for a well organized, well staffed and well funded scientific enterprise.  But the sentence also highlights some critical tensions that the war on terrorism has brought to a head.

For if the laboratory is a theater of war, then what are its rules of engagement?  War demands secrecy; science thrives on openness.  How can a free society balance those competing demands?

This is not a new question.  As my catch-phrase also indicates, the Cold War raised the same issue.  And during the decades of the Cold War, the government and the research community gradually developed a comfortable modus operandi – although it needed periodic fine tuning and almost broke down several times.  The Cold War’s rules of engagement for science continue to guide us, as they should.

But our current situation, in many ways, makes the Cold War look like the “good old days.”

Today we face an enemy who is more insidious and dispersed, and a global communications network that is far more difficult to control.  Perhaps more importantly, we live in a time when additional fields of science present security risks. 

For the first time, the biological sciences are caught on the horns of our security dilemma – just at the point when that discipline is reaching new heights of productivity.  And, to add to our difficulties, in biology, more than in any other field, the exact same research may be needed for benign and malevolent purposes.

So what is to be done?  As a nation, we’re just beginning to sort that out – and we hope that this hearing will contribute to that process.  All I know is that we must arrive at a finely tuned and constantly recalibrated balance – and we can only do that through open, honest and trusting discussions between the government and the research community.  I see this Committee as an “honest broker” in those discussions.

With that in mind, we will focus on two aspects of the problem today – the treatment of “sensitive but unclassified” information and the treatment of foreign students and faculty.  That should be more than enough to keep us busy.

I’m interested not only in our witnesses’ conclusions on the issues before us, but even more so in the reasoning that led them to those conclusions.  That’s what would help us most in grappling with these stunningly difficult matters.

I expect we will have many more hearings on this subject.  In the past year, since the terrorist attacks, I think many of us have turned to Shakespeare’s exclamation:  “O brave new world, that has such people in it.”  It’s going to take a while to figure out how science should operate in this brave new world.